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Though overall bank performance from July 2007 to December 2008 was the worst since at least the
Great Depression, there is significant variation in the cross-section of stock returns of large banks
across the world during that period. We use this variation to evaluate the importance of factors that
have been discussed as having contributed to the poor performance of banks during the credit crisis.
More specifically, we investigate whether bank performance is related to bank-level governance, country-level
governance, country-level regulation, and bank balance sheet and profitability characteristics before
the crisis. Banks that the market favored in 2006 had especially poor returns during the crisis. Using
conventional indicators of good governance, banks with more shareholder-friendly boards performed
worse during the crisis. Banks in countries with stricter capital requirement regulations and with more
independent supervisors performed better. Though banks in countries with more powerful supervisors
had worse stock returns, we provide some evidence that this may be because these supervisors required
banks to raise more capital during the crisis and that doing so was costly for shareholders. Large banks
with more Tier 1 capital and more deposit financing at the end of 2006 had significantly higher returns
during the crisis. After accounting for country fixed effects, banks with more loans and more liquid
assets performed better during the month following the Lehman bankruptcy, and so did banks from
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1.  Introduction 
Throughout the world, many large banks have seen most of their equity destroyed by the crisis that 
started in the U.S. subprime sector in 2007 and governments have had to infuse capital in banks in many 
countries to prevent outright failure. Was the poor performance of the banks the outcome of a financial 
Tsunami that hit them unexpectedly, or were some banks more predisposed to experience large losses? 
Many observers have argued that ineffective regulation contributed or even caused the collapse. If that is 
the case, we would expect differences in the regulation of financial institutions across countries to be 
helpful in explaining the performance of banks during the credit crisis. Other observers have criticized the 
governance of banks and suggested that better governance would have led to better performance during 
the crisis. Finally, it could be that banks were affected differentially simply because they had different 
balance sheets and profitability before the crisis for reasons unrelated to governance and regulation and 
that these characteristics affected their vulnerability to large adverse shocks. In this paper, we investigate 
these  possible  determinants  of  bank  performance,  measured  by  stock  returns, during  the crisis  for  a 
sample of large banks, i.e., banks with assets in excess of $50 billion at the end of 2006, across the world. 
Our sample includes 98 banks. Of these, 19 are U.S. banks. 
One striking result is that banks with the highest returns in 2006 had the worst returns during the 
crisis. More specifically, the banks in the worst quartile of performance during the crisis had an average 
return  of  -87.44%  during  the  crisis  but  an  average  return  of  33.07%  in  2006.  In  contrast,  the  best-
performing banks during the crisis had an average return of -16.58% but they had an average return of 
7.80% in 2006. This evidence is most consistent with the Tsunami explanation for the crisis: the attributes 
that the market valued in 2006, for instance, a successful securitization line of business, exposed banks to 
risks that led them to perform poorly when the crisis hit. The market did not expect these attributes to be a 
source of weakness for banks and did not expect the banks with these attributes to perform poorly as of 
2006.  
An OECD report argues that “the financial crisis can be to an important extent attributed to failures 
and  weaknesses  in  corporate  governance  arrangements”  (Kirkpatrick  (2008)).  We  find  no  evidence   3
supportive of such a statement in our data. There is no evidence that banks with better governance, when 
governance is measured with data used in the well-known Corporate Governance Quotient (CGQ score) 
perform better during the crisis. Strikingly, banks with more pro-shareholder boards performed worse 
during the crisis. Such a result does not mean that good governance is bad. Rather, it is consistent with the 
view that banks that were pushed by their boards to maximize shareholder wealth before the crisis took 
risks that were understood to create shareholder wealth, but were costly ex post because of outcomes that 
were not expected when the risks were taken. Our result is consistent with the result of Adams (2009) that 
in the U.S. banks that received TARP funds had more independent boards. Bank balance sheets and bank 
profitability in 2006 are more important determinants of bank performance during the crisis than bank 
governance and bank regulation. Banks that had a higher Tier 1 capital ratio in 2006 and more deposits 
generally performed better during the crisis. As a result, the positioning of banks as of the end of 2006 is 
more important than governance and/or regulation in explaining the performance of banks during the next 
two years. Another way to explain our results is that banks were differentially exposed to various risks by 
the  end  of  2006.  Some  exposures  that  were  rewarded  by  the  markets  in  2006  turned  out  to  be 
unexpectedly costly for banks the following two years. Overall, the explanatory power of regulatory 
variables is small compared to the explanatory power of bank-level variables.   
To test the bank-level governance hypothesis, we use data from the CGQ score and a proxy for the 
existence of a controlling shareholder. We require banks in our sample to have a CGQ index for 2006. We 
use the governance attributes of the CGQ score in the same way as Doidge, Karolyi, and Stulz (2007) and 
Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2009), namely we create subindices that capture key elements of 
governance rather than use the CGQ score directly. The subindices are for board attributes, audit function 
attributes,  compensation  policy  attributes,  and  takeover  restrictions.  With  all  subindices,  more  pro-
shareholder governance implies a higher value of the index. We find no consistent evidence that better 
governance led to better performance during the crisis, but we find strong evidence that banks with more 
shareholder-friendly boards performed worse. We also use a measure of insider ownership as a proxy for 
governance.  This  measure  is  never  related  to  performance  in  our  regressions.  Country  governance,   4
measured using the comprehensive index of Kaufman, Kray, and Mastruzzi (2008), is also not related to 
bank performance. Finally, shareholder protection as measured by the anti-director index first introduced 
in La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) is not consistently related to performance, but 
when it has a significant coefficient, the coefficient is positive. Though studies of corporate governance 
are generally plagued by concerns about endogeneity, such concerns do not seem to be relevant for our 
study. It does not seem plausible that banks’ anticipation of how they would be affected by the events of 
2007-2008 somehow influenced their choice of governance mechanisms before 2007.  
We use the database on bank regulation developed in Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001, 2004) to 
examine the hypothesis that stricter regulation prevented bank losses during the crisis. We use indicators 
for  the  power  of  the  regulators,  oversight  of  bank  capital,  restrictions  on  bank  activities,  and  the 
independence of the supervisory authority. When we compare the banks in the top quartile of return 
performance to those in the bottom quartile, the better performing banks have more restrictions on their 
activities, stronger oversight of bank capital, and a more independent supervisory authority. In multiple 
regressions, we generally find that a stronger supervisory authority has a negative impact on performance 
during the crisis and stronger bank capital oversight is associated with better performance. We interpret 
the negative coefficient on the strength of the supervisory authority as follows. If stronger supervisory 
authorities would have been more effective at preventing banks from taking risks before the crisis, we 
would expect a positive coefficient on that variable. A possible explanation for this negative coefficient is  
that once the crisis was ongoing, stronger regulators took more measures that were costly to shareholders 
to assure the survival of banks.  
When a financial crisis occurs, we would expect banks with more capital and more stable financing to 
perform better. We find that this is the case. Banks with more Tier I capital in 2006 had higher returns 
during the crisis. Further, banks that rely more on deposits in their financing also had higher returns. 
There is some evidence that larger banks performed worse. In contrast, however, the coefficients on 
measures of leverage other than Tier I, such as the ratios of equity to assets and tangible equity to 
liabilities, are not significant when we limit the sample to large banks. These latter ratios perform better in   5
terms of significance than the Tier 1 ratio in a sample that includes banks with assets in excess of $10 
billion, in contrast to our main sample that includes only banks with assets in excess of $50 billion.  
The results we have described so far concern the performance of banks from the middle of 2007 to 
the end of 2008. The month following the bankruptcy of Lehman is widely regarded as a month where 
contagion was dominant. Contagion is usually taken to mean comovement that cannot be explained by 
fundamentals. It is therefore important to investigate whether the bank characteristics we focus on can 
help understand the performance of banks during that month. With contagion, we would expect bank-
level  variables  and  regulatory  variables  to  have  no  explanatory  power  for  that  period.  In  multiple 
regressions, banks with more shareholder friendly boards performed worse in the month after Lehman.  
There is some evidence that banks with more loans to assets and with more liquid assets performed better. 
Banks from jurisdictions with strong capital supervision and more restrictions on bank activities had 
higher returns during that month. Our evidence suggests that the market discriminated across banks to 
some  extent  during  the  month  following  Lehman.  The  explanatory  power  of  our  bank  governance, 
balance sheet, performance, and regulatory variables drops in half during the month following Lehman 
compared to the period from July 2007 to the end of December 2008.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the data we use. In Section 3, we examine 
how  the  performance  of  banks  during  the  crisis  relates  to  governance,  regulation,  balance  sheet 
composition, and profitability before the crisis. In Section 4, we investigate whether the contagion that 
followed the collapse of Lehman affected banks differently depending on their attributes. In Section 5, we 
examine the robustness of our results. We conclude in Section 6.     
   
2.  Data 
To select the sample, we start from the financial institutions in Bankscope with assets in excess of 
$10  billion  in  2006.  There  are  1,245  institutions  in  Bankscope  that  satisfy  this  criterion.  We  then 
eliminate the financial institutions that are not included in the Riskmetrics database, which we use for 
bank-level governance data.  We are left with 231 institutions. This sample includes a wide variety of   6
financial  institutions:  banks,  holding  companies,  investment  banks,  brokers.  Importantly,  the  sample 
includes  all  financial  institutions  that  merged  or  went  bankrupt  during  the  financial  crisis.  We  use 
Datastream for stock returns (including dividends). Eleven institutions are dropped for various reasons: 
data errors (one), delisting before July 2007 (six), avoid duplication between the banking group and the 
financial group when both are publicly traded (two), mergers (two).
1 We are therefore left with a slightly 
smaller sample of 220 institutions. 
From  the  sample  of  220  institutions,  we  form  a  sample  of  98  institutions  that  includes  only 
institutions  that  can  be  reasonably  called  large  deposit-taking  banks.  Except  for  
Section 5, we focus on large banks in this paper. A financial institution is included in the sample of 98 
large banks if it has a loan/asset ratio above 10%, a deposit/asset ratio above 20%, total assets in excess of 
$50 billion at the end of 2006 and reports information on its Tier 1 capital ratio. These banks come from 
20  countries.  Univariate statistics for  the  data  discussed in this section  are reported in Table  1. We 
winsorize the explanatory variables at the 1% and 99% level. In this section, we describe the data as well 
as the performance measures we use.  
 
2.a. Bank returns     
Our bank performance measure is buy-and-hold dollar returns. Our main focus is on returns from the 
middle of 2007 to the end of 2008. We call this period the crisis period. The start of the period seems 
uncontroversial. The end of the period is partly dictated by data availability. Banks performed poorly 
during the first quarter of 2009 as well, but one could argue that  the returns of banks during that period 
were heavily influenced by uncertainty about resolution mechanisms and the possibility of nationalization. 
Not surprisingly, the average buy-and-hold dollar return in our sample is extremely poor at -54.43%. 
However, the standard deviation of 28.55% is surprisingly high. The banks in the sample also performed 
                                                 
1 Our sample includes banks that merged during the crisis. We excluded banks with mergers close to completion on 
July 1, 2007.   7
extremely poorly in the month that followed the bankruptcy of Lehman as they lost on average 28.81%, 
but again there is a surprisingly large standard deviation of 17.57%. 
 
2.b. Bank balance sheet and income characteristics      
We  investigate  the  hypothesis  that  characteristics  of  bank  balance  sheets  and  income  statements 
before the start of the crisis help explain the performance of banks during the crisis. We obtain these data 
from Bankscope for 2006. Our choice of variables is largely dictated by data availability. For instance, it 
would be useful to have measures of the exposure of banks to subprime loans, but such data is not 
available from Bankscope – or, for that matter, any public source. Similarly, banks’ exposure to SIVs 
played an important role in the crisis (see Acharya and Schnabl (2009)), but we have no data for this 
exposure.  
We use three different variables to capture the capital ratios of banks: 
a.  Tier 1, defined as the ratio of tier 1 capital to total risk-weighted assets; 
b.  Equity, defined as the ratio of total equity to total assets; 
c.  Tangible equity, defined as the ratio of tangible equity to total liabilities. When we do not 
have data for intangible assets, we use total equity in the numerator.  
The first is a regulatory capital ratio whereas the other two are ratios that capital markets focus on (see the 
arguments  in  Acharya,  Gujral,  and  Shin  (2009)).  Everything  else  equal,  we  would  expect  banks’ 
performance during the crisis to be positively related to capital ratios before the crisis since a bank with 
more capital would have more of a cushion to absorb adverse shocks and hence would experience less 
financial distress. To capture the composition of the liabilities we use Deposit, which is defined as the 
ratio of deposits to assets. Deposit financing is generally more sticky, so that a bank with more deposits 
will have more stable financing compared to one that relies more on money markets for its financing, 
especially  when  the  money  markets  work  poorly.  We  would  therefore  expect  that  banks  with  more 
deposit financing would have performed better. We also use Money Market defined as the ratio of money   8
market funding to assets as the withdrawal of short-term money market funding played an important role 
in the credit crisis (see, for instance, Brunnermeier (2009)). 
We use two variables to characterize the asset side of the banks. First, we use Loans defined as the 
ratio of loans to total assets. Banks where Loans is higher would be banks with a smaller portfolio of 
securities. Presumably, these banks would also have fewer assets marked to market. We would expect 
such banks to have performed better because their regulatory capital would have been less endangered by 
the  increase  in credit  spreads  that reduced  security  values  –  though  these  banks  would  have  had  to 
increase their loss reserves on their loans. We also use Liquidity which we define as the ratio of liquid 
assets to total assets. Everything else equal, we would expect banks with more liquid assets to be in a 
better position to reduce their balance sheet and to cope with financing difficulties. We also report a 
measure  of  profitability,  Profit,  defined  as  pre-tax  profits  divided  by  assets,  but  do  not  use  it  in 
regressions as it is available for only a subset of firms for 2008 and as it is sensitive to differences in 
accounting  standards  on  how  securities  and  derivatives  are  marked  to  market.  Not  surprisingly, 
profitability falls sharply from 2006 to 2008.  
 
2.c. Regulation     
The regulation hypothesis for the performance of banks during the crisis is that lax regulation led 
banks to take risks that they would not have taken with tighter regulation. With this hypothesis, we would 
expect stricter regulation to be associated with better bank performance during the crisis. To test this 
hypothesis, we use the indices of Caprio, Laeven and Levine (2007).
2 These indices are as follows: 
a)  Official, an index of the power of the commercial bank supervisory agency, includings 
elements  like  the  rights  of  the  supervisor  to  meet with  and  demand  information from 
auditors, to force a bank to change the internal organizational structure, to supersede the 
rights of shareholders, and to intervene in a bank; 
                                                 
2 These indices are also discussed in Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2001, 2004).   9
b)  Capital, an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital, Capital, including indicators for 
whether the sources of funds that count as regulatory capital can include assets other than 
cash and government securities, and whether authorities verify the source of capital; 
c)  Restrict,  an  index  of  regulatory  restrictions  on  the  activities  of  banks,  consisting,  for 
example, of limitations in the ability of banks to engage in securities market activities, 
insurance activities, real estate activities, and to own nonfinancial firms; 
d)  Independence, an index of the independence of the supervisory authority, measuring the 
degree to which the supervisory authority is independent from the rest of the government 
and the degree to which the supervisory authority is shielded from lawsuits by banks and 
other parties.  
 
Perhaps not surprisingly given our data requirements, the banks in our sample have on average stronger 
regulation indices than the average bank in studies that cover more countries such as Caprio et al. (2007).  
 
2.d. Country-level governance     
There is now considerable evidence showing that country-level governance variables are important 
determinants of firm policies and valuations as well as of financial development. Empirical work shows 
that  risk-taking  is  affected  by  shareholder  rights  as  well  as  by  a  country’s  institutions,  such  as  the 
institutions protecting property rights (see, for instance, John, Litov, and Yeung (2008)). At the level of a 
bank, we would expect that banks in countries with better institutions would be more likely to take 
decisions that maximize shareholder wealth. If bank executives took bad risks because they were not 
sufficiently focused on the interests of shareholders, we would expect banks to perform better during the 
crisis in countries with more protection of shareholder rights and stronger institutions. However, private 
benefits of control are higher in countries with poor shareholder rights and poor institutions. It could be 
that executives took fewer risks in such countries to protect their own interests. Hence, banks from these 
countries could perform better because executives paid less attention to maximizing shareholder wealth.   10
As proxies for country-level governance, we use the country-level indicators of Kaufman, Kray, and 
Mastruzzi (2008). These indicators are obtained from combining several hundred individual variables 
measuring political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, enforcement of the rule of law, 
corruption,  and  the  extent  to  which  a  country’s  citizens  are  able  to  participate  in  selecting  their 
government. We follow Kaufman et al. (1999) and consider the mean of the six variables for each country. 
We call this index Institutions and a higher value of the index indicates better institutions. We measure 
shareholder protection using Anti-director, which is the anti-director index of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) as revised in Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). The 
anti-director index takes values from 0 to 5. A higher value means better shareholder rights. Our sample’s 
lowest value is 2.  
 
2.e. Bank-level governance     
The bank governance hypothesis predicts that banks with better governance should have had higher 
returns during the crisis. Better governance could have acted through two channels. Many observers have 
argued that traders and executives of banks had incentives to take risks that were not in the best interests 
of shareholders. If these observers are right, we would expect banks with better governance to have set 
incentives and controls in such a way that in these banks traders and executives would have been more 
likely to avoid taking risks that did not benefit shareholders. Hence, these banks should have performed 
better during the crisis because their exposure to the risks that manifested themselves during the crisis 
would  have  been  lower. Though  this type  of  argument  has  been advanced by  many  observers,  it is 
worthwhile to note that it does not follow from finance theory that poor governance necessarily leads to 
more risk-taking. Following Merton (1977), there is a considerable literature making the case that greater 
risk-taking can be in the interests of shareholders in the presence of deposit insurance. Further, there is 
empirical evidence showing that poor governance can lead executives to take fewer risks to protect their 
private benefits from control (see, for instance, John, Litov and Yeung (2008)). This paper would predict 
that banks with better governance would take more risks, which would have led to poor performance   11
during the crisis if the risks taken before the crisis had unexpected bad outcomes. The second channel 
through  which  governance  could  have  affected  performance  is  that  once  the  crisis  affected  banks 
adversely, banks with better governance might have been better at coping with the crisis effectively 
because they made better decisions (see Graham and Narasimhan (2004) for a similar perspective on how 
firms weathered the Great Depression). With this channel, banks with better governance would have 
made wiser decisions during the crisis and hence they would have had better returns.  
Recent  cross-country  research  emphasizes  the  importance  of  the  nature  of  ownership  for  bank 
performance  and  risk-taking.  Most  relevant  for  our  study,  Laeven  and  Levine  (2008)  consider  the 
potential conflicts between managers and owners and analyze the relations between risk taking by banks, 
their ownership structures, and bank regulations.  They find that bank risk is generally higher in banks 
that have controlling shareholders with large stakes. However, they show that this effect is mitigated by 
the presence of strong shareholder protection laws. They conclude further that the impact of regulation on 
bank risk depends on whether the bank has a large controlling shareholder. Specifically, stricter regulation 
decreases bank risk when a bank is widely held but increases it when it has a large controlling shareholder.  
To proxy for the nature of ownership, we use an indicator variable from Bankscope which takes value 
one if there is no shareholder who controls directly or indirectly more than 25% of the shares.  We call 
this  indicator  variable  ownership.  Admittedly,  Bankscope’s  threshold  of  ownership  is  higher  than  is 
typically used to denote widely-held ownership.
3 The high threshold helps explain why the frequency of 
widely-held banks is a high 80% in our sample. Another contributing factor to the high frequency of 
widely-held banks may be that we are considering the largest banks and our data is more recent than the 
data used in other studies.
4  
We also use components of the CGQ score for 2006.  ISS started providing the Corporate Governance 
Quotient (CGQ) for U.S. companies in 2002 and for international companies in 2003.  The CGQ scores 
are now produced by Riskmetrics. The CGQ rankings are a relative measure of a firm’s investment in 
                                                 
3 For instance, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999) consider thresholds of 10% and 20%.  
4 See, for instance, Caprio, Laeven, and Levine (2007).    12
internal governance – that is, its adoption of governance attributes that increase the power of minority 
shareholders – and indicate the firm’s investment in governance relative to firms in its industry or within 
an index in which the firm is included.  To compute these indices, Riskmetrics collects information on 
governance attributes for a large number of U.S. and foreign companies. We use that information to 
construct governance subindices. How a firm fares for each attribute is determined by an examination of 
the firm’s regulatory filings, annual reports, and its website. Firms do not pay to get rated but can access 
their  ratings  and  check  for  accuracy.  Firms  can  change  their  ratings  only  by  making  and  publicly 
disclosing changes to their governance structure. For each attribute, Riskmetrics evaluates whether a firm 
meets a threshold level of implementation of the attribute and considers the firm to have that attribute if it 
meets the threshold. The advantages of using the Riskmetrics data are that it evaluates firms consistently 
across countries, that it is publicly available, and that it has been used in empirical work showing that the 
governance attributes it measures are related to firm value (see, for instance, Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and 
Williamson (2009)). Though governance indices are widely used in empirical research, such use has both 
strengths  and  weaknesses.  In  particular,  theoretical  work  shows  that  a  governance  attribute  can  be 
valuable for one firm but also can destroy wealth in another firm, so that on theoretical grounds there is 
no necessary relation between governance indices and firm value.
5 The literature has also questioned 
whether governance indices measure the right governance attributes. A further difficulty is that, as noted 
by Adams and Mehran (2003) for the U.S., regulation typically affects governance more for financial 
institutions than it does for other firms. In this paper, our ambition in using the governance attributes of 
the CGQ rankings is limited. These rankings evaluate firms according to a number of criteria that are 
considered  to  be  important  by  governance  observers  in  the  U.S.  and  we  investigate  whether  these 
attributes are related to bank performance during the crisis.    
Following Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2009), we select 44 attributes that are available for 
U.S. firms as well as for foreign firms. These attributes cover four broad subcategories: (1) Board (25 
attributes), (2) Audit (three attributes), (3) Takeover (six attributes), and (4) Compensation (10 attributes). 
                                                 
5 See, for instance, Coles, Naveen, and Naveen (2008).    13
Board attributes attempt to capture the aspects of the functioning of the board of directors that relate to 
board independence, composition of committees, size, transparency, and how work is conducted; Audit 
includes questions regarding the independence of the audit committee and the role of auditors; Takeover 
includes provisions from the firm’s charter and bylaws concerning the existence of a dual-class structure, 
the role of shareholders, and the existence of a poison pill and blank check preferred; and Compensation 
deals with executive and director compensation issues related to options, stock ownership and loans, and 
how they are determined and monitored. We average the scores for each attribute within a group to obtain 
an index for that group for each firm. A higher value of an index means that the firm’s governance is 
more favorable to the interests of shareholders for that index. As can be seen in Table 1, there is a wide 
range of values for each of the indices. The range is narrower within countries. However, it is interesting 
to note that there is substantial variation in the board index within the U.S. as well. The standard deviation 
of the index within the U.S. for the banks in our sample is roughly half its standard deviation across all 
banks.  
Table 1 shows that the banks in our sample differ substantially with respect to the characteristics we 
measure. Interestingly, all the banks meet the Basel I Tier 1 requirement at the end of 2006 since the 
lowest Tier 1 ratio is 5.79%. However, the ratio of equity to total assets is quite low for some banks as its 
minimum is 1.85%. Similarly, the ratio of tangible equity to liabilities has low values as well since its 
minimum is 1.49%. All these capitalization variables have wide ranges. For instance, for Tier 1, the range 
is from 5.79% to 14.03%. Our other bank characteristics have wide ranges as well. For instance, the range 
of  Deposits  is  from  28.49%  to  90.99%.  There  is  much  variation  in  the  governance  and  regulatory 
variables as well.  
 
3.  Determinants of bank performance during the crisis 
In this section, we first compare the characteristics of the banks that had the worst return performance 
(bottom quartile) and had the best return performance (top quartile) during the crisis. We then estimate 
multiple regressions to investigate the determinants of performance.   14
3.a. Characteristics of worst and best performing banks  
Table 2 divides the sample into the top and bottom quartiles of return performance from the middle of 
2007 to the end of 2008. By construction, the difference in average returns between these two groups is 
extremely  large.  The  bottom-performing  quartile  banks  had  an  average  return  over  that  period  of  -
87.44%; in contrast, the top-performing banks had an average return of -16.58%. Strikingly, however, the 
banks that performed poorly during the crisis had extremely high returns in 2006 as their average return 
was 33.07%. In contrast, the banks that performed better during the crisis had a much lower average 
return of 7.80% in 2006.  
The  worst-performing  banks  are  larger  banks.  We  see  that  the  best-performing  banks  had 
significantly lower leverage at the end of 2006. Interestingly, the difference in capital ratios is higher for 
the equity capital ratio than for the Tier 1 capital ratio. The best-performing banks have a Tier 1 ratio that 
is 98 basis points higher than the worst-performing banks. However, they have a ratio of equity to assets 
that is higher by 176 basis points. A similar result holds for the ratio of tangible equity to liabilities. 
Consequently, the banks that performed better had more capital but also better capital – in the sense of 
more equity.  
The better-performing banks are more traditional banks. There is an extremely large difference in the 
ratio of deposits to assets between the best-performing and the worst-performing banks. At the end of 
2006, the average deposits to assets ratio was 72.65% for the best-performing banks and 52.69% for the 
worst-performing ones. Neither the ratio of loans to assets nor the ratio of liquid assets to total assets was 
significantly different between the two groups of banks. Money market funding was not more important 
for  the  banks  that  perform  poorly.  There  was  no  difference  in  the  profitability  of  banks  in  2006. 
Obviously, there were large differences in 2007 and 2008.   
We now consider the regulation and country-level governance variables. The first variable measures 
the power of the supervisors. There is no difference in that variable between best-performing and worst-
performing banks. However, the banks that performed better come from countries with stronger oversight 
of bank capital, more restrictions on bank activities, and greater independence of regulators. Banks that   15
performed better also come from countries with worse governance. The anti-director index does not differ 
between the best-performing banks and the worst-performing banks.   
Finally, we turn now to differences in governance. There is no difference in the proportion of banks 
with concentrated ownership between the best performing banks and the worst performing banks. With 
the indices we use, a higher value of an index means that, everything else equal, the bank has more 
shareholder-friendly  governance  as  evaluated  by  Riskmetrics.  The  first  index  is  the  index  of  board 
attributes. Strikingly, the banks with the worst performance have an index with a much higher value than 
the banks with the best performance. The difference between the two means is statistically significant at 
the 1% level. Consequently, better-performing banks had a much less shareholder-friendly board than the 
worse-performing banks. There is no significant difference for the other indices.  
 
3.b. Multiple regressions   
The comparisons made in section 3.a. show that the banks that performed the worst during the crisis 
had on average, in 2006, better returns, more leverage, less deposits, more shareholder-oriented boards, 
and came from countries with better governance, weaker oversight of capital, fewer restrictions on bank 
activities and more independent supervisors.  The problem with these comparisons is that many of these 
bank  characteristics  are  correlated.  Further,  they  might  be  correlated  with  unobserved  country 
characteristics. In this section, we therefore estimate multiple regressions to evaluate the relation between 
bank characteristics and bank performance. In some of these regressions, we control for country fixed 
effects. We cannot control for country fixed effects in all regressions because of multicollinearity when 
we use our regulatory variables.  We therefore estimate regressions without the regulatory variables but 
with country fixed effects and regressions with regulatory variables but not with country fixed effects. In 
estimating the significance of the regression coefficients, we allow for clustering at the country level.  
Regression  (1)  of  Table  3  estimates  the  relation  between  bank  performance  and  bank-level 
governance  variables  and  uses  country  fixed  effects.  The  board  index  has  a  negative  coefficient 
significant at the 1% level and the takeover index has a positive coefficient significant at the 10% level.    16
However, the latter index is never significant in the other regressions. The economic significance of the 
coefficient on the board index is substantial. The firms in the bottom quartile of performance have an 
average board index of 13.80 and the firms in the top quartile of performance have an average board 
index of 10.84. A one point increase in the board index is associated with a decrease in returns of 5.04 
percentage  points.  We  explained  earlier  that  we  would  find  such  a  result  if  banks  with  more  pro-
shareholder boards took more risks that unexpectedly performed poorly. A concern, however, is that 
banks with more pro-shareholder boards could have performed more poorly because these boards forced 
management to disclose bad news. However, such an explanation seems to make it difficult to understand 
why, as we show in the next section, the coefficient on the board index is negative in the month following 
Lehman’s bankruptcy as well. We would expect that more transparent banks would have suffered less 
during  that  month  for  given  risk  exposures,  so  that  the  poor  performance  of  banks  with  more  pro-
shareholder boards seems more likely to result from the risk exposures of those banks.  
We now turn to balance sheet and income statement characteristics of banks. In Regression (2), we 
use bank characteristics and country fixed effects as independent variables. The regression uses the Tier 1 
capital  ratio  as  the  proxy  for  regulatory  capital.  We  find  that  there  is  a  significant  positive  relation 
between bank performance and Tier 1 capital. A one standard deviation increase in the Tier 1 capital ratio 
controlling  for  country  fixed-effects  improves  performance  during  the  crisis  by  14.71%.  Banks  with 
higher returns in 2006 performed worse during the crisis. No other variable has a significant coefficient.  
In regression (3), we combine regressions (1) and (2). The board index, the Tier 1 capital ratio, and 
the 2006 return are still significant and their coefficients are similar to their coefficients in the previous 
regressions. The takeover index is not significant in regression (3). However, the ratio of deposits to 
assets has a significant positive coefficient at the 5% level and size has a negative coefficient significant 
at the 10% level.    
Regressions (4) and (5) use the regulatory variables. In regression (4), we regress bank returns on the 
regulatory indices, the country-level governance index, the anti-director index, and GDP per capita. Bank   17
returns during the crisis were positively related to the index of capital supervision. Except for the anti-
director index, which has a positive coefficient, no other variable is significant in regression (4).  
Finally, in regression (5), we add to regression (4) the bank-level governance variables as well as the 
bank financial characteristics. In contrast to regression (3), neither bank size nor deposits are significant. 
However, the board index has a significant negative coefficient and the Tier 1 capital ratio has a positive 
significant  coefficient.  Further,  as  in  regression  (4),  the  index  of  capital  oversight  is  positive  and 
significant. In addition, the index of powers of supervisors has a negative significant coefficient. The 
country governance variables are not significant.  
A striking result from Table 3 is the extent to which governance and bank characteristics are helpful 
in  explaining  the  cross-sectional  variation  in  bank  returns  during  the  crisis  compared  to  regulatory 
characteristics. Though we do not report that regression, the adjusted R-squared of a regression with only 
country fixed-effects is 0.187. The adjusted R-squared of the regression using bank-level governance 
variables  and  bank  balance-sheet  and  performance  characteristics  is  0.515,  so  that  these  bank-level 
characteristics  increase  the  adjusted  R-squared  by  0.328.  In  contrast,  the  adjusted  R-squared  of  the 
regression with only regulatory variables is 0.093. The adjusted R-squared of the regression with only 
regulatory variables surely overstates the impact of regulation since the regulatory variables are likely to 
be  correlated  with  country  characteristics  not  controlled  for.  This  evidence  suggests  that  bank-level 
variables are much more important in understanding the performance of large banks during the credit 
crisis than the regulation they were subjected to.  
To better understand the role of the governance and regulatory variables, we estimated regressions 
using  information  available  from  Bloomberg  on  writedowns  and  capital  raising  for  41  banks  in  our 
sample from 11 countries. Because of the small sample, the information from these regressions is limited, 
but it is nevertheless interesting. We first regressed the ratio of writedowns to assets on the board index, 
Tier 1 capital ratio, the log of assets, the power of the supervisor, the index of capital supervision, the 
institution index, and the anti-director index. We find that the writedown ratio is positively related to the 
board index and to the powers of the supervisor, and negatively related to the Tier 1 capital ratio and the   18
strength  of  capital  supervision.  This  regression  supports  our  interpretation  that  banks  with  a  more 
shareholder-friendly board took more risks. We then estimate the same regression for capital raising, but 
now we add the ratio of writedowns to assets as an explanatory variable. In that regression, the board 
index is not significant. However, the index of the power of the supervisor has a positive significant 
coefficient  at  the  5%  level.  This  regression  is  consistent  with  the  hypothesis  that  more  powerful 
supervisors  required  banks  to  raise  more  funds  for  a  given  amount  of  writeoffs.  Of  course,  these 
regressions have to be interpreted with caution because of the small sample, of selection problems, and of 
potential endogeneity issues.   
        
4.  The performance of banks following the Lehman bankruptcy 
The Lehman bankruptcy was followed by what has generally been characterized as a period of panic 
and contagion in the markets. There is controversy about that period. For instance, Taylor (2009) argues 
that the dramatic events in the capital markets over the weeks after the Lehman bankruptcy filing were 
not triggered by the bankruptcy filing but instead by the actions of policymakers. More specifically, using 
an  event  study,  he  claims  that  the  adverse  movements  in  the  markets  followed  the  meeting  of  Fed 
Chairman Bernanke and Treasury Secretary Paulson with Congressional leaders and the announcement of 
TARP. During the month starting on the market close immediately before the bankruptcy filing (the 
Lehman bankruptcy month), the average return of the banks in our sample is -28.81%. If this dramatic 
destruction of shareholder wealth was the result of indiscriminate panic and contagion, the variables we 
have focused on so far should not be helpful in understanding the cross-sectional variation in bank returns 
during that month. In this section, we investigate whether the performance of banks during the Lehman 
bankruptcy month is related to the characteristics used in Section 3. 
In Table 4, we divide banks in the Lehman bankruptcy month into return quartiles and compare bank 
characteristics between the worst and best performing banks, similarly to the analysis conducted in Table 
2. We find that banks with the worst performance had lower Tier 1 capital and a lower deposit-to-asset 
ratio before the crisis. None of the other bank characteristics differ between the best-performing and   19
worst-performing banks at the 10% level. There are no significant differences in governance between the 
best and worst performing banks even though the board index is close to being significant at the 10% 
level. However, the best-performing banks come from countries with more powerful supervisors, more 
restrictions on bank activities, and stricter capital oversight.  
We also estimate multiple regressions for the Lehman bankruptcy month as we did for the whole 
crisis period. These multiple regressions are presented in Table 5. The board index has a significant 
negative coefficient in all regressions. The takeover index has a positive significant coefficient in the first 
regression, but not in the other ones. In regression (2), banks that performed better have a higher ratio of 
loans  to  assets  and  a  higher  ratio  of  liquid  assets  to  assets,  but  the  Tier  1  ratio  is  not  related  to 
performance.  In  regression  (3),  we  use  both  bank-level  governance  variables  and  balance  sheet  and 
performance characteristics. No bank balance sheet or performance characteristic is significant in that 
regression. In regression (4), we use only the regulatory variables. The index of capital supervision has a 
positive significant coefficient and no other regulatory variable has a significant coefficient. We also 
include the anti-director index which has a positive significant coefficient in that regression at the 1% 
level.  
Regression (5) controls for all the bank-level and regulatory characteristics we are interested in, but it 
does  not  use  country  fixed-effects.  In  that  regression,  the  board  index  has  a  significant  negative 
coefficient. The loan to assets and the liquid assets to assets ratios have positive significant coefficients, 
but again the Tier 1 ratio is not significant. The indices of capital supervision and of restrictions of bank 
activities have significant positive coefficients. The coefficient on the anti-director index is significantly 
positive as well.  
The evidence in regression (5) suggests that the market distinguished between banks following the 
bankruptcy of Lehman to some extent. However, regression (5) in Table 5 does not explain as much of 
the cross-sectional variation in returns as the comparable regression in Table 3. A concern with these 
regressions is that the regulatory variables could proxy for country characteristics. In general, fixed-
effects could alleviate that concern, but in regression (5) such an approach cannot be used because of   20
multicollinearity. When we use country-fixed effects without the regulatory variables, none of the bank 
balance sheet and performance characteristics are significant.  
 
5.  Robustness checks 
We now turn to an exploration of the robustness of our results. We focus on regression (5) in Table 3 
since that regression includes all the variables we are interested in.  We first estimate the same regression 
but with different capital ratios. The estimates are provided in Table 6. Regression (1) uses the ratio of 
equity to total assets. With that regression, the coefficient on the ratio of equity to assets is positive and 
close to being significant at 10%. The other coefficients are similar to those in regression (5) of Table 3. 
When we estimate regression (5) of Table 3 with the ratio of tangible equity to liabilities instead of the 
Tier 1 ratio, the coefficient on the ratio is positive and insignificant. The log of assets is significantly 
negative. As in all other regressions, the board index has a significant negative coefficient.  
The last three regressions of Table 6 estimate regression (3) on a larger sample. The larger sample 
differs from the sample used so far because we allow banks to be included if they have assets in excess of 
$10 billion instead of in excess of $50 billion. As in all regressions, the board index has a significant 
negative coefficient. The ratio of equity to assets and the ratio of tangible assets to liabilities have positive 
significant coefficients, but the coefficient on the Tier 1 capital ratio is not significant. The coefficient on 
liquid assets is positive and significant in each regression, but the 2006 return is not significant in these 
regressions. The log of assets has a negative significant coefficient in all the regressions. The regulation 
variables are usually not significant in this sample. It seems from these regressions that the Tier 1 ratio is 
more relevant for the large banks, whereas the other ratios are more relevant for the smaller banks.  
We performed additional robustness tests that we do not report in a table. First, we added a country’s 
stock market index return net of the banking index return. The results are generally consistent with the 
results we report in the tables when we do not include fixed-effects, though in some regressions more 
regulatory variables have positive significant coefficients. The concern about these regressions is that the 
banks in our sample are generally in the bank index. Second, we re-estimated our regressions without   21
three countries that have each only one bank in the sample. Again, the results are generally consistent 
with the regressions we reproduce in the tables – though in one regression using the larger sample the 
board index is no longer significant. Finally, we estimate the regressions using robust standard errors 
instead of clustering. The only major change resulting from using these estimates is that Tier 1 has a 
positive significant coefficient in the regressions of Table 5.   
 
 
6.  Conclusion.  
In this paper, we investigate the determinants of large bank stock return performance across the world 
during the period from the beginning of July 2007 to the end of December 2008. This period corresponds 
to the greatest destruction of bank wealth since the Great Depression. We find that banks with more 
shareholder-friendly boards performed worse during that period. In contrast, banks with more Tier 1 
capital,  more  deposits,  and  more  loans  performed  better.  Banks  from  countries  with  stronger  capital 
supervision  had  higher  returns  as  well.  Banks  from  countries  with  stronger  regulators  had  worse 
performance, but this might result from greater intervention by these regulators during the crisis at the 
expense of shareholders. In particular, using a smaller sample, we find that banks in countries with more 
powerful regulators raised more capital for a given amount of writedowns. During the month following 
the bankruptcy of Lehman, banks’ balance sheet characteristics are insignificant in regressions that allow 
for  country  fixed  effects,  but  even  during  that  month  banks  with  more  shareholder-friendly  boards 
performed worse and banks from countries with stronger capital supervision and more restrictions on 
banking fared better.    
Overall, our evidence shows that bank governance, regulation, and balance sheets before the crisis are all 
helpful in understanding bank performance during the crisis. However, banks with more shareholder-
friendly boards, which are banks that conventional wisdom would have considered to be better governed, 
fared worse during the crisis. Either conventional wisdom is wrong, as suggested by Adams (2009), or 
this evidence is consistent with the view that banks that took more risks rewarded by the market –perhaps 
because the market did not assess them correctly ex ante – before the crisis suffered more during the crisis   22
when these risks led to unexpectedly large losses. Strong evidence supportive of the latter interpretation is 
that the performance of large banks during the crisis is negatively related to their performance in 2006. In 
other words, the banks that the market rewarded with largest stock increases in 2006 are the banks whose 
stock suffered the largest losses during the crisis.    23
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
The sample includes 98 banks in Bankscope with returns available from Datastream, with loan/assets larger than 
10%, deposit/assets larger than 20%, total assets larger than $50bn as of 2006, and included in the Riskmetrics CGQ 
database. Firm characteristics are computed in 2006, prior to the beginning of the financial crisis. Tier 1 is the ratio 
of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets, equity is the ratio of equity to total assets, ownership is a dummy variable 
equal  to  1  when  no  shareholder  holds  more  than  25%  of  the  shares  directly  or  indirectly;  the  other  bank 
characteristics  are  deposits,  tangible  equity  (equity  minus  intangible  assets  whenever  available  or  equity  when 
intangible assets is not available), loans, liquid assets (all these variables are normalized by total assets except for 
tangible equity which is normalized by liabilities). The bank balance sheet and income variables are winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% levels and are expressed in percentage terms. The regulation variables come from Caprio, Laeven 
and  Levine  (2007)  using  data  in  the  2007  database  (revised  in  June  2008)  downloaded  from  the  World  Bank 
(http://econ.worldbank.org). Official is an index of the power of the commercial bank supervisory agency, restrict is 
an index of regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks, capital is an index of regulatory oversight of bank 
capital, and independence is an index of the independence of the supervisory authority. The variable institution is the 
simple average of six indicators reported by Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2008) called voice, political stability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, corruption. ADRI is the anti-director index of LLSV 
(1998) as revised in Djankov, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (2008). For corporate governance, we follow 
Aggarwal, Erel, Stulz, and Williamson (2008) and select 44 attributes that are available for U.S. firms as well as for 
foreign firms from the Riskmetrics CGQ dataset and construct indices for these attributes for broad subcategories: 
(1) Board (board, 25 attributes), (2) Audit (audit three attributes), (3) Anti-takeover (takeover, six attributes), and (4) 
Compensation and Ownership (compensation, 10 attributes).  
 
  Observations  Minimum  Maximum  Average  Median  Standard 
deviation 
Stock returns             
- 2006  98   -31.92       74.04    25.22    26.22  22.23 
- July 2007 - Dec. 2008  98   -98.75       29.14  -54.43  -55.50  28.55 
- Sep. 12 - Oct. 10, 2008  97   -89.55         3.98  -28.81  -25.46  17.57 
Bank characteristics             
- Tier 1  98      5.79        14.03      8.65     8.20     1.80 
- Equity  98      1.85        11.62      6.20      5.89     2.54 
- Tangible equity  98      1.49        13.07      6.06      5.55     2.90 
- Deposits  98    28.49        90.99     62.21    63.32  15.40 
- Money market debt  98      0.45        41.34       8.51      5.54     8.99 
- Loans  98    19.31         82.91     55.74     59.21  15.45 
- Liquid assets  98      2.88        61.94      20.30    18.75  12.19 
- Log assets  98    17.77        21.40      19.25     19.14     1.13 
- Profit rate 2006  98     -0.65          3.93       1.19       1.10     0.64 
- Profit rate 2007  97     -1.50          3.20       1.17       1.22     0.75 
- Profit rate 2008  68     -4.14          2.38        0.34       0.57      1.33 
Regulation and institution             
- Official  98      3.00          13.00      10.25     11.00      2.69 
- Capital  98      1.00         5.03        3.26       4.00     1.07 
- Restrict  98      3.00       13.00        9.01       9.00     3.02 
- Independence  98      1.00         4.00        3.36       4.00      0.83 
- Institution  98      0.59         1.79        1.33       1.27      0.29 
- ADRI   98      2.00         5.00        3.82       4.00     0.93 
Corporate governance             
- Ownership  98       0.00        1.00        0.80        1.00     0.40 
- Board  98       6.00          21.00      12.29       12.00     3.74 
- Audit  98       0.97        3.00        1.80        2.00     0.79 
- Takeover  98       1.97        6.00        3.81        4.00     0.70 
- Compensation  98       1.00        9.00        4.48        4.00     2.42   26
Table 2. Summary Statistics for banks in the first and fourth quartiles of stock return performance from July 
1, 2007 to December 31, 2008 
 
This table compares the characteristics of banks in the bottom quartile of stock return performance relative to those  
in the top quartile of stock return performance. The sample includes 98 banks in Bankscope with returns available 
from Datastream, with loan/assets larger than 10%, deposit/assets larger than 20%, total assets larger than $50bn as 
of 2006, and included in the Riskmetrics CGQ database. Firm characteristics are computed in 2006. Tier 1 is the 
ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets, equity is the ratio of equity to total assets, ownership is a dummy 
variable equal to 1 when no shareholder holds more than 25% of the shares directly or indirectly; the other bank 
characteristics  are  deposits,  tangible  equity  (equity  minus  intangible  assets  whenever  available  or  equity  when 
intangible assets is not available), loans, liquid assets (all these variables are normalized by total assets except for 
tangible equity which is normalized by liabilities). The bank balance sheet and income variables are winsorized at 
the 1% and 99% levels and are expressed in percentage terms. The regulation variables come from Caprio et al. 
(2007)  using  data  in  the  2007  database  (revised  in  June  2008)  downloaded  from  the  World  Bank 
(http://econ.worldbank.org). Official is an index of the power of the commercial bank supervisory agency, restrict is 
an index of regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks, capital is an index of regulatory oversight of bank 
capital, and independence is an index of the independence of the supervisory authority. The variable institution is the 
simple average of six indicators reported by Kaufmann et al. (2008) called voice, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, corruption. ADRI is the anti-director index of LLSV (1998) as revised 
in Djankov et al. (2008). For corporate governance, we follow Aggarwal et al. (2008) and select 44 attributes that 
are available for U.S. firms as well as for foreign firms from the Riskmetrics CGQ dataset and construct indices for 
these attributes for broad subcategories: (1) Board (board, 25 attributes), (2) Audit (audit, 3 attributes), (3) Anti-
takeover (takeover, 6 attributes), and (4) Compensation and Ownership (compensation, 10 attributes).  *, **, and 
*** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Mean of banks in bottom 
quartile of distribution of returns  
Mean of banks in top quartile  
of distribution of returns  
Test for equality of means 
(p values) 
Stock returns       
- 2006   33.07      7.80  0.000
*** 
- July 2007-Dec. 2008  -87.44  -16.58  0.000
*** 
- Sep. 12 - Oct. 10, 2008  -46.94  -15.43  0.000
*** 
Bank characteristics       
- Tier 1      8.19      9.17  0.035
** 
- Equity      5.20      6.96  0.017
** 
- Tangible equity      5.23      7.00  0.036
** 
- Deposits    52.69      72.65  0.000
*** 
- Money market debt      8.89       6.01  0.178 
- Loans    56.12      58.18  0.613 
- Liquid assets    17.52      19.17  0.608 
- Log assets 2006    19.55      18.63  0.001
*** 
- Profit rate 2006      1.03        1.28  0.239 
- Profit rate 2007      0.63       1.28  0.003
*** 
- Profit rate 2008    -0.68       1.07  0.001
*** 
Regulation, institution       
- Official   10.80     11.32  0.407 
- Capital      2.72       3.64  0.004
*** 
- Restrict      8.12      10.92  0.002
*** 
- Independence      3.64       3.28  0.095
* 
- Institution      1.44       1.31  0.011
** 
- ADRI       3.84       4.06  0.377 
Corporate governance       
- Ownership      0.88       0.76  0.279 
- Board    13.80      10.84  0.007
*** 
- Audit      1.88        1.68  0.422 
- Takeover      3.68        3.96  0.153 
- Compensation      4.76        4.00  0.285   27
Table 3. Returns regressions for July 2007-December 2008 
 
The regressions estimate the relation between buy-and-hold stock returns over the period July 2007-December 2008 
and bank characteristics. The sample includes 98 banks in Bankscope with returns available from Datastream, with 
loan/assets larger than 10%, deposit/assets larger than 20%, total assets larger than $50bn as of 2006, and included 
in the Riskmetrics CGQ database. Firm characteristics are computed in 2006. Tier 1 is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to 
risk-weighted assets,  ownership is a dummy variable equal to 1 when no shareholder holds more than 25% of the 
shares directly or indirectly; the other bank characteristics are deposits, tangible equity (equity minus intangible 
assets whenever available or equity when intangible assets is not available), loans, liquid assets (all these variables 
are normalized by total assets except for tangible equity which is normalized by liabilities). The bank balance sheet 
and income variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels and are expressed in percentage terms. The regulation 
variables come from Caprio et al. (2007) using data in the 2007 database (revised in June 2008) downloaded from 
the World Bank (http://econ.worldbank.org). Official is an index of the power of the commercial bank supervisory 
agency, restrict is an index of regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks, capital is an index of regulatory 
oversight of bank capital, and independence is an index of the independence of the supervisory authority. The 
variable institution is the simple average of six indicators reported by Kaufmann et al.(2008) called voice, political 
stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, corruption. ADRI is the anti-director index of 
LLSV (1998) as revised in Djankov et al. (2008). For corporate governance, we follow Aggarwal et al.(2008) and 
select 44 attributes that are available for U.S. firms as well as for foreign firms from the Riskmetrics CGQ dataset 
and construct indices for these attributes for broad subcategories: (1) Board (board, 25 attributes), (2) Audit (audit, 
3attributes), (3) Anti-takeover (takeover, 6 attributes), and (4) Compensation and Ownership (compensation, 10 
attributes).  Regression  1  includes  corporate  governance  attributes,  regression  2  includes  bank  characteristics, 
regression 3 includes corporate governance attributes and bank characteristics, regression 4 includes regulation and 
country variables, regression 5 includes corporate governance attributes, bank characteristics, regulation, country 
variables. The p-values, in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the country-level. *,  **, and  ***  indicate 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Adj.-R
2 is adjusted R-squared. 
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Constant  -41.859  -94.767  -39.362  -114.751  -61.444 
    (0.269)    (0.150)    (0.581)      (0.177)    (0.730) 
Board    -5.038 
 
    -5.435      -2.976 
    (0.008)
***      (0.001)
***      (0.031)
** 
Audit   13.972       9.724       8.052 
    (0.117)      (0.197)      (0.269) 
Takeover   12.271     11.668       6.837 
    (0.053)
*      (0.121)      (0.129) 
Compensation    -0.257       0.039      -0.570 
    (0.882)      (0.985)      (0.720) 
Ownership    -7.369      -5.602    -11.327 
    (0.317)      (0.344)      (0.139) 
Tier 1       8.174     7.947       5.011 
      (0.006)
***    (0.004)
***      (0.045)
** 
Deposits       0.398     0.557       0.200 
      (0.197)    (0.020)
**      (0.394) 
Money market debt      -0.323     0.228        0.127 
      (0.591)    (0.695)       (0.826) 
Loans       0.062    -0.234        0.303 
      (0.822)    (0.581)       (0.312) 
2006 return       -0.712    -0.685       -0.326 
      (0.024)
**    (0.006)
***       (0.092)
* 
Liquid assets       0.914     0.354        0.423 
      (0.172)    (0.499)       (0.393) 
Log assets      -3.098    -3.777       -1.733 
      (0.117)    (0.064)
*       (0.439) 
Official            -0.705     -2.720 
            (0.526)     (0.041)
** 
Capital             6.378      7.904 
            (0.046)
**     (0.068)
* 
Restrict             1.974      2.281 
            (0.373)     (0.223) 
Independence              -3.289      9.640 
            (0.476)     (0.169) 
Institution             3.462    11.667 
            (0.799)     (0.501) 
ADRI             7.329      1.148 
            (0.033)
 **     (0.781) 
Log GDP             0.728     -9.535 
            (0.942)     (0.596) 
Number of observations  98  98  98   98  98 
Adj.-R
2  0.290  0.419  0.515    0.093  0.354   29
Table 4. Comparison of the best performing and worst performing banks during the month of the Lehman 
bankruptcy (from September 12 to October 10, 2007) 
This table compares the characteristics of banks in the bottom quartile of stock return performance and in the top 
quartile of stock return performance from September 12 to October 10 2007. The sample includes 97 banks in 
Bankscope with returns available from Datastream, with loan/assets larger than 10%, deposit/assets larger than 20%, 
total assets larger than $50bn as of 2006, and included in the Riskmetrics CGQ database. Firm characteristics are 
computed in 2006. Tier 1 is the ratio of Tier 1 capital and risk-weighted assets, equity is the ratio of equity to total 
assets, ownership is a dummy variable equal to 1 when no shareholder holds more than 25% of the shares directly or 
indirectly; the other bank characteristics are deposits, tangible equity (equity  minus intangible assets  whenever 
available or equity when intangible assets is not available), loans, liquid assets (all these variables are normalized by 
total  assets  except  for  tangible  equity  which  is  normalized  by  liabilities).  The  bank  balance  sheet  and  income 
variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels and are expressed in percentage terms. The regulation variables 
come from Caprio et al. (2007) using data in the 2007 database (revised in June 2008) downloaded from the World 
Bank (http://econ.worldbank.org). Official is an index of the power of the commercial bank supervisory agency, 
restrict is an index of regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks, capital is an index of regulatory oversight of 
bank capital, and independence is an index of the independence of the supervisory authority. The variable institution 
is  the  simple  average  of  six  indicators  reported  by  Kaufmann  et  al.  (2008)  called  voice,  political  stability, 
government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, corruption. ADRI is the anti-director index of LLSV 
(1998)  as  revised  in  Djankov  et  al.  (2008).  Following  Aggarwal  et  al.  (2008)  we  select  44  attributes  that  are 
available for U.S. firms as well as for foreign firms from the Riskmetrics CGQ dataset and construct indices for 
these attributes for broad subcategories: (1) Board (board, 25 attributes), (2) Audit (audit, 3 attributes), (3) Anti-
takeover (takeover, 6 attributes), and (4) Compensation and Ownership (compensation, 10 attributes). *, **, and *** 
indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
  Mean of banks in bottom quartile 
 of distribution of returns  
Mean of banks in top quartile  
of distribution of returns  
Test for equality of 
means (p values) 
Stock returns       
- 2006    32.80      17.41  0.023
** 
- July 2007-Dec. 2008  -82.37    -29.79  0.000
*** 
- Sep. 12 - Oct. 10, 2008  -52.54      -8.64  0.000
*** 
Bank characteristics       
- Tier 1      7.92      8.64  0.072
* 
- Equity      5.54      6.71  0.136 
- Tangible equity      5.38      6.76  0.134 
- Deposits     55.55     64.25  0.054
* 
- Money market debt        9.61      7.99  0.550 
- Loans     54.06     58.97  0.260 
- Liquid assets      18.60     19.18  0.862 
- Log assets      19.69     19.15  0.117 
- Profit rate 2006        0.99       1.25  0.258 
- Profit rate 2007        0.87       1.20  0.103 
- Profit rate 2008       -0.32       0.66  0.008
*** 
Regulation, institution       
- Official       10.32      11.46  0.048
** 
- Capital         2.80        3.58  0.023
** 
- Restrict         8.36      10.00  0.069
* 
- Independence         3.40        3.37  0.918 
- Institution         1.38        1.26  0.103 
- ADRI         3.70        4.00  0.270 
Corporate governance       
- Ownership         0.84         0.75  0.445 
- Board       13.04       11.33  0.120 
- Audit         1.80         1.83  0.885 
- Takeover          3.72         3.92  0.226 
- Compensation          4.36         4.42  0.964   30
Table 5. Returns regression for the Lehman bankruptcy month (September 12-October 10, 2008) 
 
This  table  shows  estimates  of  regressions  bank  returns  during  the  Lehman  bankruptcy  months  on  bank 
characteristics. The sample includes 97 banks in Bankscope with returns available from Datastream, with loan/assets 
larger than 10%, deposit/assets larger than 20%, total assets larger than $50bn as of 2006, and included in the 
Riskmetrics CGQ database. Firm characteristics are computed in 2006, prior to the beginning of the financial crisis. 
Tier 1 is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets, ownership is a dummy variable equal to 1 when no 
shareholder holds more than 25% of the shares directly or indirectly; the other bank characteristics are deposits, 
tangible equity (equity minus intangible assets whenever available or equity when intangible assets is not available), 
loans, liquid assets (all these variables are normalized by total assets except for tangible equity which is normalized 
by liabilities). The bank balance sheet and income variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels and are 
expressed in percentage terms. The regulation variables come from Caprio et al. (2007) using data in the 2007 
database (revised in June 2008) downloaded from the World Bank (http://econ.worldbank.org). Official is an index 
of the power of the commercial bank  supervisory agency, restrict is an index of regulatory restrictions on the 
activities of banks, capital is an index of regulatory oversight of bank capital, and independence is an index of the 
independence of the supervisory authority. The variable institution is the simple average of six indicators reported 
by Kaufmann et al. (2008) called voice, political stability, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, 
corruption. ADRI is the anti-director index of LLSV (1998) as revised in Djankov et al. (2008). For corporate 
governance, we follow Aggarwal et al.  (2008) and select 44 attributes that are available for U.S. firms as well as for 
foreign firms from the Riskmetrics CGQ dataset and construct indices for these attributes for broad subcategories: 
(1) Board (board, 25 attributes), (2) Audit (audit three attributes), (3) Anti-takeover (takeover, six attributes), and (4) 
Compensation and Ownership (compensation, 10 attributes). Regression 1 includes corporate governance attributes, 
regression  2  includes  bank  characteristics,  regression  3  includes  corporate  governance  attributes  and  bank 
characteristics, regression 4 includes regulation and country variables, regression 5 includes corporate governance 
attributes, bank characteristics, regulation, country variables. The p-values, in parentheses are adjusted for clustering 
at the country level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Adj.-
R
2 is adjusted R-squared. 
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Constant      -34.366       -28.278      -14.162  51.533  85.508 
  (0.293)  (0.570)  (0.865)  (0.284)  (0.197) 
Board       -2.628 
 
         -2.715    -1.878 
       (0.004)
 ***        (0.045)
**         (0.006)
*** 
Audit  7.296    4.933    3.668 
  (0.342)    (0.508)    (0.387) 
Takeover  8.741    6.653    3.691 
    (0.089)
*    (0.134)    (0.327) 
Compensation  0.678    0.503    1.566 
  (0.475)    (0.623)    (0.192) 
Ownership       -7.204           -9.267              -9.935 
  (0.193)    (0.158)    (0.111) 
Tier 1    2.962  2.978    2.642 
    (0.236)  (0.269)    (0.176) 
Deposits           -0.337         -0.238              -0.228 
    (0.126)  (0.227)    (0.282) 
Money market 
debt/Assets  
         -0.025  0.356    0.334 
    (0.906)  (0.332)    (0.188) 
Loans    0.422  0.325    0.356 
        (0.041)
**  (0.210)        (0.027)
** 
2006 return     -0.132         -0.089    -0.052 
    (0.308)  (0.411)    (0.627) 
Liquid assets    0.713  0.417    0.489 
         (0.041)
 **  (0.226)        (0.018)
** 
Log assets    -1.955  -1.991    -1.454 
    (0.546)  (0.580)    (0.574) 
Official             -0.005            -0.413 
        (0.994)  (0.569) 
Capital        3.272  4.512 
           (0.036)
**    (0.097)
* 
Restrict        1.294  3.154 
        (0.148)       (0.006)
*** 
Independence             -1.900  2.179 
        (0.418)  (0.506) 
Institution             -2.207  8.806 
        (0.803)  (0.303) 
ADRI        4.610  5.297 
            (0.006)
***       (0.005)
 *** 
Log GDP           -10.928          -19.798 
        (0.104)       (0.003)
*** 
Number of observations  97  97  97  97  97 
Adj.-R
2  0.192  0.141  0.225  0.068  0.217   32
Table 6. Returns regressions for the period of July 2007-December 2008 with different capitalization ratios 
and samples 
  
This Table shows estimates of regression (5) of Table 3 for different capital ratios and different samples.  The large 
bank sample includes 98 banks in Bankscope with returns available from Datastream, with loan/assets larger than 
10%, deposit/assets larger than 20%, total assets larger than $50bn as of 2006, and included in the Riskmetrics CGQ 
database. The small bank sample includes banks satisfying the same criteria except that they have assets in excess of 
$10 billion. Firm characteristics are computed in 2006. Tier 1 is the ratio of Tier 1 capital to risk-weighted assets, 
equity is the ratio of equity to total assets, tangible equity is the ratio of tangible equity to total liabilities, ownership 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 when no shareholder holds more than 25% of the shares directly or indirectly; the 
other bank characteristics are deposits, tangible equity (equity minus intangible assets whenever available or equity 
when intangible assets is not available), loans, liquid assets (all these variables are normalized by total assets except 
for tangible equity which is normalized by liabilities). The bank balance sheet and income variables are winsorized 
at the 1% and 99% levels and are expressed in percentage terms. The regulation variables come from Caprio et al. 
(2007)  using  data  in  the  2007  database  (revised  in  June  2008)  downloaded  from  the  World  Bank 
(http://econ.worldbank.org). Official is an index of the power of the commercial bank supervisory agency, restrict is 
an index of regulatory restrictions on the activities of banks, capital is an index of regulatory oversight of bank 
capital, and independence is an index of the independence of the supervisory authority. The variable institution is the 
simple average of six indicators reported by Kaufmann et al. (2008) called voice, political stability, government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, corruption. ADRI is the anti-director index of LLSV (1998) as revised 
in Djankov et al. (2008). For corporate governance, we follow Aggarwal et al. (2008) and select 44 attributes that 
are available for U.S. firms as well as for foreign firms from the Riskmetrics CGQ dataset and construct indices for 
these attributes for broad subcategories: (1) Board (board, 25 attributes), (2) Audit (audit, 3attributes), (3) Anti-
takeover (takeover, 6 attributes), and (4) Compensation and Ownership (compensation, 10 attributes). The p-values, 
in parentheses are adjusted for clustering at the country level. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. Adj.-R
2 is adjusted R-squared.  

















           
Constant  62.402  79.168     -77.157        -13.742        -10.756 
  (0.670)  (0.582)  (0.466)  (0.886)  (0.910) 
Board         -3.068         -2.809       -2.251         -2.785          -2.716 
    (0.057)
*  (0.083)
*      (0.045)
**     (0.016)
**     (0.017)
** 
Audit         10.080         11.451  0.058         -0.535  0.052 
  (0.192)  (0.106)  (0.990)  (0.919)  (0.992) 
Takeover  6.744  6.952  4.053  4.219  4.081 
  (0.186)  (0.193)     (0.041)
**    (0.051)
*    (0.057)
* 
Compensation         -0.319          -0.642  2.157   2.729  2.546 
  (0.837)  (0.662)  (0.473)   (0.318)  (0.359) 
Ownership         -8.318          -8.571       -9.613  -8.294          -8.053 
  (0.285)  (0.278)  (0.104)   (0.150)  (0.156) 
Tier 1      2.159     
      (0.306)     
Equity  1.749      2.733   
  (0.110)          (0.006)
***   
Tangible equity    0.635      2.259 
    (0.697)         (0.038)
** 
Deposits  0.205  0.280  0.185  0.136  0.120 
  (0.280)  (0.139)  (0.364)  (0.495)  (0.549) 
Loans         -0.010          -0.074  0.234  0.131  0.134 
  (0.972)  (0.796)  (0.393)  (0.584)  (0.548) 
2006 return          -0.389          -0.350      -0.166         -0.263          -0.251 
     (0.027)
**     (0.035)
**  (0.356)  (0.185)  (0.226) 
Liquid assets  0.556  0.474  0.903  0.981  0.955 
  (0.123)  (0.134)      (0.004)
***      (0.003)
***      (0.003)
*** 
Log assets         -4.124          -4.215       -5.243          -5.909  -6.099 
      (0.034)
**     (0.049)
**    (0.063)
*          (0.005)
***      (0.009)
*** 
Official          -2.384          -2.401       -1.564  -1.490  -1.617 
    (0.055)
*     (0.051)
*  (0.193)  (0.194)  (0.151) 
Capital  8.489  8.802  6.637  5.719  5.690 
      (0.015)
**      (0.011)
**    (0.093)
*  (0.164)  (0.149) 
Restrict  1.315  1.775  2.684  2.064  2.004 
  (0.537)  (0.449)     (0.047)
**  (0.150)  (0.158) 
Independence  6.218  5.908  4.404  3.522  3.516 
  (0.317)  (0.341)  (0.451)  (0.528)  (0.536) 
Institution  23.472  21.312      13.190         24.500          22.926 
  (0.158)  (0.198)  (0.376)    (0.093)
 *  (0.117) 
ADRI  2.275  2.571  5.861  5.536  5.485 
  (0.526)  (0.427)    (0.089)
*  (0.142)  (0.135) 
Log GDP        -13.384        -14.899       -0.743         -4.539           -3.700 
  (0.426)  (0.371)  (0.943)  (0.691)  (0.747) 
Number of observations  98  98  175  175  175 
Adj.-R
2  0.309  0.301  0.308  0.320  0.314 
   